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This study uses field data from 490 hotels in a single lodging chain to investigate three questions 
related to the efficiency-wage hypothesis. (1) Does paying workers higher relative wages ex ante 
result in better ex post actual performance, either by motivating workers to exert greater effort or 
by attracting higher quality workers? (2) Is the magnitude of the relation between performance 
and wages the same when workers are overpaid versus underpaid? (3) Do the overall benefits of 
paying higher wages outweigh the costs?  The data enable us to perform powerful tests of wage-
performance relations because exogenous factors that likely affect employee behavior are 
standardized across hotels. Our results suggest that actual performance (measured by customer 
satisfaction, revenues, and profit) is increasing in the relative wage, and that higher performance 
is the result, and not the cause, of higher wages.  We find that the magnitude of the wage-
performance relation is at least as large for workers who are overpaid compared to those who are 
underpaid.  This result, which differs from the results of experimental studies, suggests that 
overpaid workers do not rationalize away wage premiums.  Finally, our results indicate that 
increases in wages do, in fact, pay for themselves.  A $1,000 increase in the general manager’s 
relative wage results in a $1,080 increase in profit for the mean hotel.  This research contributes 
to a series of studies that investigates the extent to which wages influence performance (e.g., 
Levine, 1992; Fehr and Falk, 1999; Hannan, Kagal, and Moser, 2002; Hannan, 2005), and 
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Data Availability: The confidentiality agreement with the firm that provided data for this study 
precludes revealing its identity and disseminating data without its written consent. 
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1. Introduction  
 The efficiency-wage hypothesis posits that when the productivity of workers is 
determined by wages, employers will increase wages until the marginal benefit of higher wages 
offsets the increase in the wage bill.  Implicit in this hypothesis is the assumption that paying 
workers higher wages ex ante results in higher productivity ex post by motivating employees to 
exert greater effort or by attracting higher quality workers.  Explicit in the hypothesis is the 
conjecture that increases in wages pay for themselves through increased productivity.  
Efficiency-wage assumptions and implications have been investigated at length in the 
economics, sociology, and accounting literatures; however, there have been relatively few 
attempts to empirically test the link between wages and actual performance with field data.  
 Using data on 490 hotels in the same lodging chain, we address three fundamental 
questions proposed by the efficiency-wage hypothesis.  The first question is: do higher wages 
lead to better performance? Several archival studies link relative wages to self-reported effort, 
job satisfaction, commitment, and intentions to quit (Akerlof et al., 1988; Levine, 1993; Peffer 
and Langton, 1993); however, few investigate actual performance because it is difficult to 
empirically establish whether higher wages are the cause or the result of better performance 
(Wadhwani and Wall, 1991; Levine, 1992).1  Second, is the magnitude of the hypothesized 
positive relation between performance and relative wages the same when workers are underpaid 
versus overpaid?  Sociological theories contend that workers who are overpaid tend to increase 
their own psychological evaluations of their inputs until they equal their wages; those who are 
underpaid tend to quit or decrease effort levels until they are commensurate with their wages.  
Experimental evidence generally supports this prediction; however, the few archival studies that 
                                                
1 Several laboratory experiments that control for selection and performance incentives find that employees choose higher effort 
levels when they are paid higher than expected wages (e.g., Fehr and Gachter, 2000, Hannan et al., 2002, Hannan, 2005). 
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address this asymmetry find that the wage-performance relation is stronger for overpaid workers.  
The third question we address is: do the overall benefits of paying higher wages outweigh the 
costs?  In equilibrium, the benefits should equal the costs, yet there is little empirical support for 
this premise because prior research has not been able to determine the total cash value of 
increases in performance (Levine, 1992; Capelli and Chauvin, 1992; Chen and Sandino, 2012).  
Within-firm data enable us to overcome many of the limitations encountered in cross-firm tests 
of efficiency-wage predictions. Accordingly, this research contributes to a series of studies that 
investigate the extent to which compensation influences performance in the absence of explicit 
pay-for-performance incentives (e.g., Levine, 1992; Fehr and Falk, 1999; Hannan, Kagal, and 
Moser, 2002; Hannan, 2005).  
 We investigate our research questions using a proprietary data set containing detailed 
compensation and performance information on 490 individually-managed hotels in a single 
domestic U.S. lodging chain.  The data enable us to perform powerful tests of wage-performance 
relations because exogenous factors that likely affect employee behavior are standardized across 
hotels.  The hotel general managers (GMs) in this study perform the same job, receive the same 
training and benefits, are subject to the same compensation and personnel policies, and are 
evaluated using the same metrics.  A key GM performance indicator, controllable profit, enables 
us to quantify any cash benefit associated with higher levels of GM remuneration.  The GMs in 
our study are paid a standard salary and housed in a small rent-free apartment in the hotel, thus 
total remuneration for each GM is the sum of her salary and the rental value of the apartment. 
Differences in rental housing costs across hotel locations give rise to significant variation in the 
total value of GM remuneration.  We exploit this variation to test efficiency-wage predictions.       
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 Consistent with the fundamental assumption underlying relative-wage theories, our 
results indicate that hotel performance is positively associated with the relative wage received by 
the GM.  Customer satisfaction, revenue per available room, and controllable profit are 
significantly (p < 0.05, one-tailed) increasing in the relative wage.  Consistent with prior 
research, the likelihood that the GM quits (or is dismissed) is negatively and marginally 
significantly (p < 0.10, one-tailed) associated with the relative wage.  Our second research 
question asks whether the wage-performance relation is symmetric for workers who are 
underpaid compared with those who are overpaid.  We find that changes in customer satisfaction 
and turnover in response to wage changes are significantly larger (p < 0.05, two-tailed) for 
workers who are overpaid relative to those who are underpaid; changes in revenue and 
controllable profit per room in response to wage changes do not differ significantly between 
underpaid and overpaid workers. Thus, our results do not support variants of equity theory 
contending that overpaid workers are more likely to reassess the value of their inputs than 
underpaid workers.  Finally, our results indicate that increases in the marginal benefit of paying 
higher wages is at least as large as the marginal cost of paying higher wages.  A $1,000 increase 
in GM compensation is associated with a $1,080 net increase in profit.  This is the first study of 
which we are aware that demonstrates that the incremental benefit derived from paying higher 
wages is at least as large as the incremental cost, and thus provides strong support for the 
efficiency-wage hypothesis.  
The remainder of this paper is organized into four sections. In the next section we 
develop our hypotheses. Section 3 discusses our data and the research design. Section 4 presents 
the empirical analyses and results. The last section concludes the paper. 
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2. Literature Review and Hypotheses  
2.1 Relative Wages and Performance 
 The efficiency wage hypothesis posits that when the productivity of observable identical 
workers is determined by wages, employers will increase wages until the marginal benefit of 
higher wages offsets the increase in the wage bill.  Accordingly, firms that pay high wages are 
predicted to have better performance arising from higher worker output and lower turnover.  
Implicit in the hypothesis is the assumption that paying workers higher wages ex ante results in 
higher productivity ex post.  Below we discuss three different justifications for this premise (see 
Yellen, 1984 for a review).  
 Economic models (e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) show that above-market wages deter 
shirking because they make workers’ jobs more valuable.  In these models, workers exercise 
some discretion in the amount of effort they put forth because performance measures do not 
perfectly capture employee effort, and it is costly for employers to monitor a worker’s every 
action.  In such settings, paying wage premiums above the market-clearing wage may be an 
effective way for firms to provide workers with the incentive to exert more effort and engage in 
less shirking.  
 Adverse selection provides a second rationalization for efficiency wage predictions 
(Weiss, 1980).  Selection models assume that workers are heterogeneous in their ability, that the 
firm has imperfect information on applicants’ abilities, and that ability and reservation wages are 
positively correlated. In this setting, firms offering higher wages will attract more capable 
applicants who will exhibit higher levels of performance.  Conversely, those offering relatively 
low wages will attract less capable applicants.   
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 A third justification for efficiency wages is rooted in sociological theories on gift 
exchange and reciprocity.  These theories posit that relative wage levels determine employees’ 
perceptions of whether they are being treated fairly, which in turn, influence employees’ effort 
levels (Akerlof, 1982 & 1984, Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Fehr and Gachter, 2000).  Workers 
develop a conception of what constitutes a fair wage by comparing their wages to the wage 
received by workers in the same or similar jobs.  Workers who perceive that they are being paid 
more than what constitutes a fair wage will reciprocate with their employer by worker harder. 
When workers are not receiving a wage they think is fair, they adjust their production downward 
to correspond to the pay received. 
 Both experimental and archival researchers have investigated the proposed effects of 
higher wages.  Sociological experiments on gift exchange and reciprocity generally support the 
premise that workers who are paid higher wages reciprocate by choosing higher effort levels, 
even though they could not be rewarded ex post for the incremental effort (e.g., Fehr and Falk, 
1999, Hannan et al., 2002, Hannan, 2005).  These experiments do not, however, address the 
effects of shirking or selection.  Several archival studies support (although not unanimously) a 
positive association between wages and perceptual measures related to performance, including 
higher levels of self-reported effort and commitment (Levine, 1993), worker satisfaction 
(Akerlof, Rose, and Yellen, 1988, Pfeffer and Langton, 1993, Levin, 1993), and performance 
ratings (Holzer, 1989).  Yet, few studies have investigated whether paying above-market wages 
improves actual performance because it is difficult to establish whether higher wages are the 
cause or the result of better performance (Capelli and Chauvin, 1992, p. 770).  Moreover, 
identifying and controlling for exogenous, nonwage factors that affect worker productivity, such 
as differences in worker and job characteristics, is problematic. 
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 Two relevant studies investigate the link between relative wages and actual productivity 
by augmenting a standard production function with measures of the average relative wage for a 
firm or business unit.  In a cross-firm study of 219 U.K. manufacturing firms, Wadhwani and 
Wall (1991) regress changes in sales on changes in relative wages and a set of production-related 
variables (number of employees, capital stock, etc.), and they find that changes in sales are 
positively correlated with changes in relative wages.  Levine (1992) obtains similar results in a 
sample of 369 business units.  Neither study can conclusively determine whether wage increases 
drive sales growth or whether sales growth causes wages to increase.  The later will be the case if 
firms share the proceeds of greater productivity with workers or firms use incentive contracts to 
reward performance.  Wadhwani and Wall (1991) calculate an average wage for each firm by 
dividing remuneration for all employees by the number of employees without attempting to 
address differences in worker skill, job characteristics, or wage-productivity relationships within 
or across firms.  Levine (1992) obtains the average wage for a business unit relative its top three 
competitors in the same product market; however, averaging across workers and jobs, even 
within the same product market, is still problematic.  A third firm-level study by Leonard (1987) 
regresses sales levels on wage levels and finds no relation.  We address many of the limitations 
of cross-firm studies by conducting intra-firm tests of managers performing the same job, within 
the same company, but receiving different levels of remuneration.  
 Although theoretical and experimental research suggests a positive relation between 
wages and performance, we may not observe a positive relation in practice for two reasons (Chen 
and Sandino, 2012, p. 973).  First, employees may not actively benchmark their wages against 
those of comparable employees, and thus, they may not perceive themselves as being over- or 
undercompensated.  Benchmarking may be particularly difficult for the hotel mangers in our 
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study because part of their remuneration is housing. Second, prior studies show that employees 
rationalize wage deviations over time as they reassess the value of their inputs.  Still, given the 
strong theoretical and experimental support for efficiency-wage prediction, we predict that 
relative wages will be positively correlated with actual performance as stated in H1a.   
H1a: Relative wages are positively associated with performance. 
 Higher wages also have positive implications for turnover.  The economic reasoning 
underlying labor turnover is similar to that for shirking (Salop, 1979).  Higher wages make 
workers’ jobs more valuable; therefore, they will be more reluctant to quit or engage in 
dysfunctional behavior that could get them fired. Sociological theories also support a negative 
relation between relative wages and turnover.  When people perceive that they are not receiving 
a fair wage they may quit rather than adjust production downward.  Empirical research provides 
strong support for a negative relation between relative wages and turnover (e.g., Akerlof et al., 
1988, Holzer, 1990, Levin, 1993) and disciplinary dismissals (Capelli and Chauvin, 1992).  
Accordingly, we predict that GM terminations will be decreasing in the relative wage, as stated 
in H1b. 
H1b: Relative wages are negatively associated with the likelihood that a manager quits 
or is terminated. 
 
2.2 The Performance Effects of Being Overpaid versus Underpaid 
 We also investigate whether the magnitudes of the wage-performance and wage-turnover 
relations are the same when manager compensation is above and below the median.  Theories on 
adverse selection and shirking predict no difference in the magnitudes.  The correlation between 
relative wages and the ability of the job applicant pool should be constant across all wage levels.  
Similarly, the value of a worker’s job is directly proportional to the relative wage.  Income 
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effects have the potential to weaken the wage-performance more when individuals are overpaid 
versus underpaid because income effects are increasing in wages.   
 In contrast to economic models that assume humans are exclusively self-interested, some 
sociological research suggests that wage-performance and wage-turnover relations will be 
smaller for workers who are overpaid compared with those who are underpaid (Akerlof and 
Yellen, 1990; Gneezy and List, 2006).  If workers perceive that their inputs are not equal to the 
value of their remuneration, they may reassess the value of their own inputs rather than adjusting 
actual inputs.  It is more likely that overpaid workers will adjust their own psychological 
evaluations of their labor inputs upward than underpaid workers will adjust their evaluations 
downward (Hatfield and Sprecher, 1984).   
 Experiments generally show a stronger performance response for underpaid workers 
relative to overpaid workers, while archival studies find the opposite.  In a study of 52 U.S. 
firms, Levin (1993) finds no evidence that overpayment leads workers to reevaluate their inputs, 
or that underpayment leads them to report lower job satisfaction, pay satisfaction, or 
commitment.  In fact, the relation between wages and outcome variables is at least as strong for 
workers who are overpaid than for those that are underpaid.  Chen and Sandino (2012) find a 
similar result in their study of the effects of relative wages on theft.  Employee theft decreased 
significantly in the magnitude of the overpayment, but theft was not significantly associated with 
the magnitude of the underpayment.  Given mixed results of experimental and archival research 
on responses to underpayments and overpayments, we pose the following research question.      
RQ 1:  Is the magnitude of the relation between relative wages and performance 
(turnover) the same for managers who make less than the median wage compared with 
those who make more? 
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3. Data and Research Design 
3.1 Data 
To test our hypotheses, we obtained internal data from a U.S. lodging chain. These data 
included income statements, customer satisfaction scores, property characteristics and employee 
demographics for the year 2010. In addition, we gathered local unemployment, wage, and rental 
housing data for each hotel. The county-level unemployment rate was obtained from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics at http://www.bls.gov. Housing rent data came from Zillow at 
http://www.zillow.com/research/data. After matching hotel data to local area demographic 
variables, our final sample consisted of 497 observations for most regression models. Before 
describing the research tests and variables, we begin with a brief description of the research site. 
A typical property has 110 rooms and is staffed by a general manager (GM), a head 
housekeeper, a maintenance worker, six housekeepers and four front desk attendants.2 GMs, who 
live in an apartment on-site, have a high degree of autonomy over property management, 
including recruitment, sales and marketing, and scheduling employee hours.  GMs recommend 
pricing strategy with corporate marketing and conduct sales calls with local businesses. The GM 
identifies and selects local contractors (e.g., resurfacing the parking lot, landscaping and snow 
removal) and makes recommendations for major repairs. A good GM routinely inspects the 
property, engages with his/her employees, trains front desk staff and interacts with customers. In 
short, management believes the right person in the GM position makes all the difference; that is, 
a poorly-performing property can be turned around by a good manager and, similarly, a bad 
manager results in lost sales, higher costs and more customer complaints.  
Our setting—an economy lodging chain—offers an empirically powerful setting for tests 
                                                
2 While the typical property is 108 rooms in size, the firm operates a limited number of large properties (160+ 
rooms). Since these properties have the potential differ in many ways (e.g., resort locations with larger staff), they 
were excluded from our data set. 
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of the efficiency-wage hypothesis for several reasons. First, as mentioned above, GM decisions 
and actions directly affect hotel profitability. The efficiency-wage hypothesis is relevant only 
when employees can exercise significant discretion in the choice of effort levels and their effort 
levels can materially affect performance (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Yellen, 1984). 
Second, properties are highly similar in size and operation, but spread throughout the 
country in urban, suburban and rural areas. The production and delivery of services is identical 
for each hotel. The size of the relationship between wages and performance should not differ 
across hotels. To limit heterogeneity in service production, we focus on the economy properties 
operating in a single country and offering only one product: the provision of rooms.3   
Third, corporate management cannot easily monitor GM actions. Many properties are 
geographically dispersed and the Regional Managers who oversee GMs typically visit each 
property only once per month. Customer feedback (e.g., online survey forms, guest cards, social 
media and complaints), revenue, profit and internal audit ratings are used to evaluate GM 
performance, but these are imperfect measures of GM effort. 
Finally, GMs are bonus-eligible, but these performance-based rewards are small and do 
not appear to provide much of an incentive. Bonuses, as we will show, are not significantly 
correlated with GM performance measures, the average (maximum) bonus being just 5.5 (11.5) 
percent of GM salary. We include the bonus in our tests to control for its effect on performance 
and to control for GM ability. 
3.2 Testing H1a: Relative Wages and Performance 
To test Hypothesis 1a, we estimate three models to capture different dimensions of 
managerial performance. The first model predicts a positive association between relative wages 
                                                
3 The firm operates in all segments of the industry, but midscale, upscale and luxury properties offer a larger array of 
services such as food and beverage outlets, business centers, gift shops, and meeting spaces. 
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and the first dimension of performance, customer satisfaction: 
Customer Satisfaction = β0 + β1 Relative Wages + β2 Experienced GM + β3 Skill:Bonus 
+ β4 Span of Control + β5 Property Size  
 + β6 Capacity Utilization + β7 Property Age + β8 Renovated + ε 
Each variable is described below. 
Customer Satisfaction is the mean response by customers to an online survey’s item 
regarding their overall guest experience. While the survey encompasses multiple items, the 
overall experience score is the only item that matters regarding employee compensation.4 The 
measure is also highly correlated (r = -.71) with customer complaints, a measure of customer 
dissatisfaction, hence the negative relationship. The item is a 10-point, Likert-type measure 
anchored by “Extremely Satisfied” and “Extremely Dissatisfied”. Customer Satisfaction 
exhibited a skewed distribution since a small proportion of properties had low scores. To 
linearize the relationship with the predictor variables, we applied a cube root transformation.  
The main variable of interest in our study is Relative Wages. This measure is calculated 
as the sum of the GM’s annual salary, annual bonus compensation and the median housing rental 
value for the zip code divided by the BLS median wage for lodging managers in the property’s 
core-based statistical area (CBSA). We include rental values in calculating total GM 
remuneration, the numerator, because the GM lives rent-free in a small apartment at the hotel. A 
value greater (less) than 1.0 for the measure indicates that a particular GM’s total compensation 
is above (below) that of the median lodging manager in his/her area. 
Several control variables are included in the model. With Experienced GM, we control 
for a manager’s experience at the property. This measure is a dummy variable equal to one if a 
                                                
4 This is not unlike many teaching evaluations where Deans and department chairs usually focus on the overall 
classroom experience. 
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manager has been at the property for more than one year. We chose to model this as dummy 
variable rather than use GM tenure because it takes time to become familiar with the challenges 
of running a particular property but, after a period of one year, additional time on the job doesn’t 
increase one’s skill level. 
We include bonus expense as a control for GM performance and ability. Skill: Bonus 
equals bonus expense as a proportion of the GM’s annual salary. The mean (median) annual 
salary was $33,264 ($32,647) and the corresponding bonus expense was $1,820 ($1,813). The 
mean bonus is 5.5% of annual salary. 
Our third variable controls for monitoring by regional managers. Span of Control is 
calculated as the number of properties supervised by a property’s regional manager. Closer 
supervision is possible when a regional manager has fewer properties (GMs) to supervise. In 
more heavily populated regions properties are closer together and the company naturally 
responds by assigning regional managers more properties. 
The fourth control variable, Property Size, captures the greater complexity and challenges 
of running a larger property versus a smaller one. Ceteris paribus, guests should be more 
satisfied at a smaller property. To linearize the relationship with the dependent variable, Property 
Size equals the square root of the number of rooms available at the property. 
Capacity Utilization controls for the average annual occupancy at a property. It is 
calculated as rooms rented divided by rooms available during the year. Evaluation of monthly 
quality scores indicates a decline in customer satisfaction (and corresponding rise in complaints) 
during the summer months when occupancy rates in the hospitality industry are high. Problems 
with noise, check-in/check-out speed, and staffing are at their highest levels when hotels are near 
capacity. 
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Our last two control variables control for the physical characteristics of each property. 
Property Age is the square root of the number of years since the hotel has been in operation with 
the company.5 Renovated is a dummy variable equal to one if the property has been renovated in 
the last three years. Many hotels undergo renovations at five- to seven-year intervals; therefore, a 
property renovated within three years in the “newer half” of its expected life cycle. Properly 
renovated hotels can expect very long lives. Accordingly, we expect customer satisfaction scores 
to be higher for recently renovated hotels. 
The second model predicts a positive relation between relative wages and financial 
performance, as measured by revenues and by profit: 
Financial Performance = β0 + β1 Relative Wages + β2 Experienced GM + β3 Skill:Bonus  
+ β4 Span of Control + β5 Property Age + β6 Renovated  
+ β7 Unemployment + β8 Market Conditions + ε 
Revenue is measured as the revenue per available room (known as REVPAR). This 
measure captures the manager’s ability to maximize both sales price (known as ‘average daily 
rate’) and capacity utilization (i.e., occupancy). Both are key metrics in the lodging industry and 
are closely monitored by company management. Accordingly, REVPAR is a good measure of 
GM performance. Since REVPAR exhibits a positive skew, we use a square root transformation.   
Profit is our final dependent variable for performance and is measured as the square root 
of a property’s total revenues minus total controllable expenses. Controllable expenses include, 
among other items, labor costs, supplies, repairs and maintenance, local advertising and utilities. 
As with other variable transformations, the square root transformation was chosen as interactive 
scatterplots indicated this transformation provided the most linear relationship between Profit 
                                                
5 This measure is imperfect as some hotels were acquired and the measure does not reflect the actual age of the 
building. 
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and the model’s predictor variables. 
In these two models we remove the Property Size and Capacity Utilization variables used 
in the customer satisfaction model and incorporate two different controls. The first of these, 
Unemployment, is the 2010 county-level unemployment rate. Unemployment increases the 
penalty associated with being fired, inducing higher effort at any given wage (Shapiro and 
Stiglitz 1984). Therefore, Unemployment should be positively associated with performance.  The 
second variable controls for differences in market conditions. We compute Market Conditions as 
average REVPAR for each hotel’s local market area using data for each hotel’s “competitive 
set.” The competitive set is comprised of similar economy hotels within close proximity of the 
company’s hotel. Market Conditions is the sum of the property and competitor revenues divided 
by the sum of the property and competitor available rooms. Higher values indicate better market 
conditions (i.e., higher rates and/or higher occupancy levels). 
3.3 Testing H1B: Relative Wages and GM Termination 
To test Hypothesis H1b, which predicts a negative relation between relative wages and 
GM turnover, we estimate the following logistic regression model: 
GM Termination = β0 + β1 Relative Wages + β2 Skill:Bonus + β3 Span of Control 
+ β4 Unemployment + β5 Rooms Rented + ε 
The dependent variable, GM Termination is a binary variable whose value is one if a 
manager was terminated during 2010. Relative Wages is defined above. The control variables in 
this model are Skill:Bonus, Span of Control, Unemployment and Rooms Rented. Rooms Rented, 
the only control variable not yet defined, is the number of rooms rented during the year. GMs 
with greater skill are more likely to be successful and, therefore, have a lower likelihood of 
termination. We do not have a prediction for span of control: GMs with greater autonomy may 
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feel a greater sense of achievement and entrepreneurialism and may be more likely to remain 
with the firm. On the other hand, closer supervision may result in greater levels of support and, 
therefore, higher levels of performance. As mentioned above, unemployment raises the penalty 
associated with being fired so we expect a negative association between Unemployment and GM 
Termination.  
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on all variables. For our main variable of interest, 
Relative Wages, the mean (median) ratio of relative wages is 0.985 (0.984); that is, the typical 
GM’s total compensation is slightly below that of comparable lodging managers.  
-Insert Table 1 about here- 
In Table 2 we present Pearson and Spearman correlations for our variables. Consistent 
with our hypotheses, we observe significant, positive correlations between Relative Wages and 
each of the three performance measures: Customer Satisfaction, Revenue and Profit. 
-Insert Table 2 about here- 
4.2 Results for H1a: Relative Wages and Performance 
Our first hypothesis posits that relative wages are positively associated with performance.  
The results show strong support for H1 (see Table 3). The relative wage is positively and 
significantly (p < 0.05, one-tailed) associated with Customer Satisfaction (β1 = 0.119), Revenue 
(β1 = 0.079) and Profit (β1 = 0.102).  
-Insert Table 3 about here- 
Many of the control variables have signs consistent with our predictions, although only 
about half of these are statistically significant. Properties with experienced GMs (β2 = 0.106, p < 
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0.01), smaller properties (β5 = -0.068, p < 0.10) and recently renovated properties (β8 = 0.126, p 
< 0.01) exhibit higher levels of customer satisfaction. Market conditions significantly influence 
property revenue (β8 = 0.477, p < 0.01) and profit (β8 = 0.444, p < 0.01). Not surprisingly, 
renovated hotels have higher revenue (β6 = 0.186, p < 0.01) and higher profits (β6 = 0.173, p < 
0.01), while properties receiving less attention by regional managers (i.e., a larger span of 
control) have significantly lower levels of revenue (β4 = -0.083, p < 0.05) and profit (β4 = -0.102, 
p < 0.01). 
4.3 Results for H1b: Relative Wages and GM Termination 
The final column of Table 3 reports results of tests of H1b, which posits that the 
likelihood of GM termination is lower when relative wages are higher. Consistent with our 
prediction, the odds ratio for Relative Wages is less than 1.0 (b1 = 0.401, p < 0.10 one-tailed), 
which indicates that increasing relative wages lowers the probability of GM termination. In this 
model, all control variables are significant, with odds ratios consistent with our expectations. In 
particular, more skilled GMs, as measured by Skill:Bonus, are less likely to be terminated (b2 = 
0.832, t = -2.56). Consistent with efficiency-wage predictions, higher levels of unemployment 
significantly reduce the likelihood of GM termination, as managers will have difficulty finding 
alternative employment (b4 = 0.319, t = -2.72). A higher level of rentals (Rooms Rented) 
decreases the likelihood of GM termination (b5 = 0.999, t = -1.40). Lastly, a greater span of 
control reduces the likelihood of GM termination (b3 = 0.903, t = -1.96); less scrutiny may 
enhance job autonomy that improves job satisfaction.  
4.4 Results for RQ1: Asymmetries in Wage-Performance Relation 
 Research question 1 asks whether the positive wage-performance and wage-termination 
relations identified in Table 3 are equal when the relative wage is negative versus positive. We 
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test RQ 1 by partitioning the sample based on whether the relative wage is below or above the 
BLS median wage and running the performance and turnover regression models for each sub-
sample separately. Approximately 55 percent of sample observations are below the median 
wage, thus, sub-samples are of comparable size.  
 Results are contained in Table 4. The Relative Wage coefficients are significantly (p < 
0.05, two-tailed) larger in the above-median sub-samples for Customer Satisfaction and GM 
Termination. For these two measures, the above-market wage sub-samples drive the positive 
relations between relative wages and performance/terminations identified in Table 3. In fact, 
when the relative wage is below the market, there is no significant relation between relative 
wages and Customer Satisfaction or GM Termination. There is no significant difference in 
coefficient sizes for the Revenue and Controllable Profit sub-samples. These results suggest that 
overpaid workers do not reassess the value of the inputs any more so than underpaid workers and 
run counter to experimental tests of equity theory. Our results are consistent with archival, inter-
firm studies conducted by Levin (1993) and Chen and Sandino (2012). One explanation for the 
difference in archival and experimental results is that, in practice, wages have a much larger 
impact on shirking and employee selection than they do on actions motivated by perceived 
inequity (Gneezy and List, 2006). More field studies on the symmetry of the wage-performance 
relation are warranted to better understand workers’ reactions to actual under- and overpayments.   
4.5 Do Higher Wages Pay for Themselves? 
 Having established that relative wages are significantly and positively associated with 
performance, we test whether the marginal cost of paying higher wages is equal to the marginal 
benefit. Our results indicate that a $1,000 increase in the GM’s relative wage results in a $1,087 
increase in controllable profit for the average hotel in the sample. After adjusting for social 
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security taxes on wages, the increase is $1,080. This likely underestimates the total cash impact 
of higher wages because it does not take into consideration the increase in customer satisfaction 
and the decrease in turnover associated with higher wages. Current levels of customer 
satisfaction can affect future profits (Ittner and Larcker, 1998, Anderson et al., 2004) and in 
untabulated tests, we find that GM turnover is negatively associated with controllable profit.  
This is the first study of which we are aware that demonstrates that the incremental benefit 
derived from paying higher wages is at least as large as the incremental cost, and thus shows 
support for the efficiency-wage hypothesis. Prior studies have generally found that the costs of 
paying higher wages far exceed the benefits; however, these studies have not calculated the total 
cash impact related to wage increases (Cappelli and Chauvin, 1991; Levin, 1992; Chen and 
Sandino, 2012).6  
5. Conclusion 
  We use field data to address the following questions stemming from the efficiency-wage 
hypothesis: (1) Is performance increasing in the relative wage paid to employees; (2) Is the 
relation between performance and wages the same when workers are overpaid versus underpaid; 
and, (3) Do the overall benefits of paying higher wages outweigh the costs?  
  We investigate our research questions using a proprietary data set containing detailed 
compensation and performance information on 490 individually-managed hotels in a single 
domestic U.S. lodging chain. The data enable us to perform powerful tests of wage-performance 
relations because exogenous factors that likely affect employee behavior are standardized across 
hotels. Turning to our first research question, our results indicate that hotel performance (as 
measured by customer satisfaction, revenue per available room, and controllable profit) is 
                                                
6 In a cross-firm study, Levine (1992) finds that increasing relative wages improves productivity as much as if the firm had used 
the incremental wages to hire more workers. This result, however, is not robust to measuring the change in wages over one-year 
increments rather a three-year increment. 
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positively and significantly associated with the relative wage. The small performance-based 
bonuses available to GMs provide negligible performance incentives, thus, we can reasonably 
conclude that higher performance is the result, and not the cause, of higher wages. To investigate 
the second research question concerning asymmetries in the wage-performance relation, we 
partition the sample according to whether the relative wage is negative or positive. The 
performance response to wage changes is significantly larger (Customer Satisfaction, Profit, GM 
Termination) or the same size (Revenue) for workers who are overpaid compared with those who 
are underpaid. These results contrast prior experimental studies that suggest overpaid workers 
are more likely to reassess the value of their inputs than underpaid workers. Our results are, 
however, consistent with prior cross-firm archival studies by Levine (1993) and Chen and 
Sandino (2012). The differences in results between experimental and field research suggests that 
more research is needed in this area. Evidence on our third research question indicates that 
increases in wages do, in fact, pay for themselves through higher profits. A $1,000 increase in 
the GM’s relative wage results in a $1,080 increase in profit for the mean hotel, after deducting 
social security wage taxes. 
  Numerous studies have found positive correlations between relative wages and measures 
related to performance; however, few measure actual performance. Moreover, most studies find 
rather small elasticities of performance, and none is able to determine the total cash value of 
performance increases. Even if high wages lead to better performance, companies are not paying 
efficiency wages if the wage-performance relation is weak. Accordingly, our study contributes to 
the economics and accounting literature by providing some of the first field evidence that paying 
higher wages ex ante leads to better actual performance ex post; and, that the marginal benefit of 
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Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 
Relative Wages 514 0.985 0.198 0.528 0.984 1.534 
Customer Satisfaction 551 7.445 0.641 3.000 7.501 10.000 
Revenue 551 26.655 7.614 11.358 25.582 87.350 
Profit 551 11.910 6.187 -2.893 11.033 61.298 
GM Termination 551 0.207 0.405 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Experienced GM 551 0.891 0.312 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Skill: Bonus 551 5.496 1.550 0.002 5.538 11.452 
Span of Control 533 17.987 2.418 11.000 18.000 25.000 
Unemployment 551 10.032 3.029 3.600 9.400 29.700 
Property Size 551 108.887 22.305 42.000 110.000 158.000 
Capacity Utilization 551 62.304 10.341 27.395 61.881 92.444 
Property Age 551 23.118 10.312 1.000 21.000 48.000 
Renovated 551 0.102 0.302 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Market Conditions 551 28.373 4.874 16.019 28.010 55.857 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Relation Between Relative Wage and Model Variables 
 
Dependent Variable 
 Customer   GM 
Variable Predicted sign Satisfaction Revenue  Profit Termination 
Relative Wages +/- 0.119 *** 0.079 ** 0.102 ** 0.401 * 
  (2.55)  (1.92)  (2.41)  (-1.48) 
 
Experienced GM + 0.106 *** 0.010  .041  
  (2.37)  (0.25)  (1.02)  
 
Skill: Bonus +/- 0.034  -0.020  -0.009  0.832 *** 
  (0.76)  (-0.51)  (-0.23)  (-2.56) 
 
Span of Control -/? -0.038  -0.083 ** -0.102 *** 0.903 ** 
  (-0.76)  (-1.99)  (-2.39)  (-1.96) 
 
Property Size - -0.068 *    
  (-1.40)     
 
Capacity Utilization - -0.013 
  (-0.26)     
 
Property Age  - -0.049  0.038  0.014 
  (-1.04)  (0.94)  (0.34)  
 
Renovated + 0.126 *** 0.186 *** 0.173 ***  
  (2.75)  (4.65)  (4.23)  
 
Unemployment ?/-   0.012  -0.032  0.319 *** 
    (0.30)  (-0.79)  (-2.72) 
 
Market Conditions +   0.477 *** 0.444 ***  
    (11.91)  (10.82)  
 
Rooms Rented -       0.999 * 
        (-1.40) 
F-test/Likelihood Ratio 3.10 23.77 20.12 21.26 
R-squared 0.048 0.280 0.249 0.042 
N 497 497 494 497 
Notes. Standardized coefficients. t-statistics in parentheses. For convenience, ***, **, and * indicate significance 
levels of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively (1-tailed when there is a prediction). Coefficients in the logistic regression 
are odds-ratios. Under “Predicted sign”, when there are multiple variables, the first “+” or “-“ refers to the sign on 
the coefficient for the Customer Satisfaction, Revenue, and Profit regressions, the second sign refers to the GM 
Termination regression. 
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